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In her article, "Overcoming a Puzzle about Inclusion and Anti-Racism," Susan Stark addresses a central concern for philosophers teaching about race: how to create a classroom that is inclusive and welcoming for all students. She examines ways that creating inclusive classroom environments can help to fight against racism and be a model for a just society. Stark addresses the challenge of how to create a classroom environment that is inclusive of both students of color and white students alike. Her article will be of interest to anyone who teaches about racism as well as those who are interested more generally in creating a more inclusive classroom environment.
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As teachers, many of us value inclusion and strive to enact classroom policies that foster it: from attendance policies, to reading assignments, to encouraging comments in class, much of the work we do as teachers aims to create an atmosphere where our students feel included and are included. I will argue that the thoughtful extension of a teacher's ordinary commitment to inclusion can be a tool in the fight against racism and can foster a just classroom that can be a model for a just society.
But simply striving to be inclusive of all students will not guarantee progress on overcoming racism. This is because it may be difficult to simultaneously foster an atmosphere of inclusion for students of color and for white students.
Valuing inclusion in the fight against racism thus presents a philosophical puzzle: it can seem impossible to be fully inclusive of all one's students, especially if the members of one's class have a diversity of identities. For instance, fostering inclusion and welcoming the participation of students of color may require validating their anger at racism, at white privilege (the idea that when some are disadvantaged based on their race, others are advantaged or privileged based on theirs), and at white supremacy (the view that whiteness is the norm against which all values should be compared). 1 And precisely this validation may promote a feeling of exclusion for white students. Or, again, fostering inclusion and welcoming the participation of white students may require creating a space where these students can explore and come to terms with their own racism and white privilege. But this may perpetuate white privilege and white supremacy and in so doing exclude students of color. Working to overcome racism through an inclusive classroom is not straightforward. It is this problem that I aim to address here.
My plan for the paper is as follows: I begin by offering some support for my assumption that the United States is a white supremacist (in the sense defined above) culture. The existence of this white supremacy in the larger culture creates a culture of exclusion for non-white people. The first step in fostering an inclusive classroom is to be aware of potential sources of exclusion. I thus examine some sources of exclusion on college campuses and suggest some ways to fight against it. 2 I then turn to the puzzle offered above: that it can be challenging to foster inclusion both of white students and of students of color. I conclude the paper arguing that it is possible, at least in many circumstances, to create a climate that is inclusive both of students of color and of white students alike. Fighting against the sources of exclusion and working to create an inclusive classroom are two important steps in fighting against racism, white privilege, and white supremacy and thus creating a classroom that is a microcosm of a more just society.
The assumption that the United States is a white supremacist culture is important for several reasons. First, it is important because it shows that addressing racism is multi-faceted work: it requires working against racism itself (the idea that someone has either explicit beliefs or implicit attitudes that value one race over another), but it also requires working against white supremacy and white privilege. Ending racism thus requires more than individual transformations (of belief and implicit attitudes); it also requires social, institutional change that ends white supremacy and white privilege. Second, the assumption that the U.S. is a white supremacist society is also important because it helps us to see that our classrooms will, by default, also be white supremacist societies unless thoughtful measures are taken to prevent this.
When I say that the U.S. is a white supremacist society, I mean that most people in the U.S. tacitly consider whiteness or Eurocentrism to be the norm. I should underscore that this is not to justify that our cultural norms are Eurocentric, but rather to acknowledge that they are. Here is some evidence for thinking that the cultural norms in the U.S. are Eurocentric: many of the images presented in advertising, on TV, and in movies are images of white people or people of European descent. For instance, the first 39 images in a recent Google search of "woman" are images of white women, and only 2 of the first 50 images in this search are of possibly non-white (though very light skinned and Eurocentrically featured) women. 3 Moreover, the Academy Awards have recently been criticized as "too white," as failing to acknowledge the achievements of non white actors. 4 The movie and television industries, more broadly, have been criticized for failing to provide a variety of roles for non-white actors. Most often, non-white actors are typecast into roles of non-white characters.
Recent work in empirical psychology also supports the idea that we are living in a white supremacist society. For many years it has been known that a preponderance of people living in the U.S. (regardless of race) associate white race or European descent with the value "goodness" and associate black race or African decent with the disvalue "badness." This has been measured by Implicit Association Tests, where test subjects are asked to quickly and accurately sort descriptive and normative words into categories. 5 Researchers have found that subjects more quickly and accurately sort words into their categories when the categories are "African American or Bad"/"European American or Good" than when the categories are "African American or Good"/"European American or Bad." The researchers conclude that most people (more than 75 percent of test takers) have an implicit association between African American and bad, and between European American and good, and that is why they sort words more quickly and accurately into these categories. Finally, studies show that people who have implicit associations between white race and good/black race and bad are more likely to discriminate against non-white people in their actions (this has been demonstrated in the contexts of medicine, of allocations of resources, and of hiring). 6 When teaching in a white supremacist culture, our classrooms risk being white supremacist and reinforcing white privilege unless we teach specifically to avoid this. Perhaps the first way we can avoid white supremacist/white privileging classrooms is by being sensitive to various sources of exclusion for students of color. 7 Students of color can be profoundly and harmfully excluded from a class for a number of reasons. First, institutionalized racism may cause students of color to be and feel excluded from their institution and, by extension, from the classrooms at their institution. Institutionalized racism is a phenomenon whereby institutions create and perpetuate a climate of exclusion of students of color because the institutions maintain racist allegiances. These allegiances send the message that these institutions were created (only) for white students (and faculty) and that non-white students (and faculty) do not belong at these institutions.
Consider some examples: Amherst College was widely criticized recently for its unofficial mascot, Lord Jeff (the British commander, Lord Jeffrey, who argued for the eradication of the Native North Americans in 1763). 8 The existence of such a mascot at the institution sends the message that Amherst values the genocide of Native Americans and thus causes students of color to feel excluded, unwelcome, and undervalued. Similarly, black students at Harvard in 2014 began a tumblr campaign entitled "I, too, am Harvard," depicting all of the insensitive microaggressive statements white students, parents, and others had said to them. 9 Their message clearly reflects their sense of exclusion and not belonging at Harvard and identifies one of the sources of this exclusion, namely, comments from fellow classmates and others. These pervasive (micro)aggressive comments send the message that black students do not belong at Harvard, that this institution was not created for them or for people with whom they identify, and these messages undermine their confidence in their value and inclusion at Harvard. Students at Princeton, at Yale, and at many other institutions have criticized these schools for (historically) naming buildings after slaveholders, white supremacists, and segregationists and for (currently) failing to disavow these individuals (Woodrow Wilson, John Calhoun, Lord Jeff, among others) and failing to distance the institution from them. 10 It is the continued existence of buildings honoring these problematic individuals that causes some students of color to feel unwelcome and not valued; the existence of these so-named buildings also creates exclusive academic environments that function to exclude non-white students from these institutions. Finally, it has recently been widely reported that institutions like Georgetown University have benefitted from selling hundreds of enslaved African-Americans and had named buildings after the priests who arranged this sale.
11 These many examples of institutionalized racism (and they are just the tip of the iceberg) also present a problem for a teacher because institutional racism threatens to permeate one's classroom unless extraordinary measures are taken to resist this occurrence.
What measures can an individual teacher take to prevent the institutionalized exclusion of students of color? First, to address the problem of institutional racism, teachers must work to see their institutions disavow the injustices of the past, both materially and morally: institutions must cease to honor their racist foreparents, and they must stop materially benefitting from these injustices.
Second, teachers must also carefully consider the material they teach, as course material can also be a source of exclusion for students of color. This may occur in a variety of ways. First, consider that many courses in philosophy (moral philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, and so on) address questions that have historically been of interest to Europeans and people of European descent. So even before a course holds any class meetings, the issues being discussed may exclude students of color because they are issues that have been of interest to people of European descent, people with whom students of color may not identify. It is possible that the particular philosophical questions selected in these courses are timeless and interesting to all regardless of their identities. But it is also possible that certain philosophical questions are of interest primarily to Europeans and people of European descent. And if this is the case, then focusing a course on Eurocentric questions may contribute to excluding students of color. But even if the questions considered in philosophy courses are of universal interest, the particular answers given to philosophical questions often reflect the Eurocentric and racist culture of the authors.
12 It is thus possible that students of color (who do not identify with Europeans) may feel excluded or feel that their perspectives and the perspectives of people with whom they do identify are not valued.
One solution to this problem is for a philosopher to develop expertise in the fields of Asian philosophy and African philosophy and teach philosophy courses in these fields. Some philosophers are doing precisely this. But not all philosophers will choose this path.
For those who do not, it will be especially important to be sensitive to the identities of the authors of the material one teaches. This can be difficult to do: even when a teacher makes every effort to include a diversity of issues on the syllabus, still, in philosophy, it is likely that a plurality of the readings will be from authors who are white (and perhaps also male, cis-gender, straight, able-bodied, etc.). This is especially true in fields like metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, metaethics, and the history of philosophy. But even in feminist philosophy, a field that has developed to respond to oppressions, still many of the philosophers writing in this field are white.
In response to these problems of exclusion, the teacher of philosophy, in any subfield, does well to include on the syllabus issues of non-Eurocentric genesis wherever possible, and to include people of a variety of identities, writing on the widest possible variety of issues. An excellent male student of color (a philosophy major) in one of my classes recently made the following comment after a college-wide lecture by a prominent African American male scholar: "It was so important for me to hear this wonderful, articulate, inspiring lecture, by someone who looks like me. Seeing him enabled me to imagine that I might someday be a professor too." The importance of representing a diversity of perspectives in one's course material, on a diversity of issues, in the identity of the members of one's department, and as an antidote to institutionalized racism cannot be overemphasized. Or, for instance, if one is teaching about reproductive issues in a feminist philosophy course, one might consider not just the issue of the moral and legal status of abortion (as this is an issue that has been of interest primarily to white women) but also or instead consider the issue of the freedom to reproduce and raise children as one sees fit (this has been a deep problem for women of color in the U.S., where there is a history of forced sterilizations and, currently, state intrusions into childrearing are frequent and pervasive
13
).
In addition to considering the identities of the authors read in the course materials and considering the sorts of issues that may affect people of color, I want to briefly discuss one further contributor to exclusion in the classroom. Students in my junior/senior seminar are required to give a class presentation on their final paper topics. One of my male students of color gave an excellent PowerPoint presentation. His presentation, as is typical of PowerPoint presentations, included a number of pictures of faces in addition to explanations of the ideas. Not surprisingly, all of the people pictured in his presentation were people of color. As teachers, and especially as white teachers, we need to be sensitive to the images we offer to our students.
Even if our issues are issues of interest to people of color and our readings present a diversity of perspectives, if our off-to-the-side images on our syllabi, in our presentations, and in the videos we show are predominantly of white people, we contribute to excluding our students of color.
Fostering classrooms that are truly inclusive of students of color is important and worthwhile work. It contributes to rectifying the historical and ongoing oppressions of people of color. Designing our courses to be inclusive of students of color thus benefits these students because it works to rectify and avoid perpetuating these injustices. But working toward this inclusivity also benefits society. It does this because it helps create a society in which all its members can achieve their fullest potential.
To this point, I have attempted to identify some sources of exclusion of students of color (both institutional and at the classroom and syllabus level) and to suggest a few ways to counteract these exclusions in the service of creating more fully inclusive classrooms. I now want to briefly discuss another important aspect of the fully inclusive classroom: I believe that teachers of philosophy ought also to foster inclusive spaces that invite and make possible transformation for white students. This is important in two ways. It is important for white students to learn about racism, white privilege, and white supremacy in general. But I also believe it is important for white students to become aware of their own (explicit and implicit) racism, their own white privilege, and the way in which they themselves help perpetuate a white supremacist society.
Before I suggest a few strategies aimed at promoting this goal, I want to address an objection some may have to the very idea that classrooms should be sensitive to white students. That is, historically classrooms have been sensitive only to white students. Continuing to be sensitive to white students may perpetuate the historical and ongoing oppressions of students of color by continuing to foreground the concerns and needs of white students over those of students of color. Sensitivity to the needs and concerns of white students, according to this objection, is thus fundamentally unjust.
I agree that it is unjust to continue to foreground or even acknowledge the needs of white students to the exclusion of those of students of color. But I believe that in many cases, a teacher can attend simultaneously to the experiences and realities of students of color and to those of white students. I want to underscore that attending to the experiences of the white students in our classes should not be done by excluding (in the ways I have detailed above) students of color. And though situations may arise in which it is difficult to be fully inclusive of both (or many) groups of students, I believe that very often one can foster inclusion of students of color at the same time one creates a space for personal reflection for white students. So even though conflicts are certainly possible (and may arise frequently in some settings), I believe that the two goals are, to a large extent, aligned.
Moreover, I believe that it is important for white people to acknowledge their explicit and implicit racism. This is the first step for white people to work for social change, to work against racism, white supremacy, and white privilege. This anti-racism work can be done only after personal transformation (acknowledging one's explicit and/or implicit racism). And personal transformations occur best when spaces exist that foster and encourage personal reflection and change. So in addition to foregrounding the experiences of our students of color, it is also important to attend to the experiences of white students, at least so that we can promote personal transformation and collectively work for social justice.
Thus I will give three examples where the goal of creating an inclusive classroom for students of color also creates an inclusive space for the white students in that class so that they can be open to personal transformation. In many of my classes (in a whole range of ethics classes, and in feminism classes), I teach about implicit associations. I present some research about them, I present research that finds that the presence of implicit associations is correlated with the performance of discriminatory actions, and I ask students to complete several implicit association tests. I also share with my students my own personal finding that I had some associations (especially about gender) indicating an implicit bias. And, finally, I present research and philosophical arguments about the possibility of overcoming implicit biases. Through this approach, I attempt to make clear that philosophical inquiry is personal inquiry both about the beliefs we hold and about the attitudes we possess and that both can be changed to align with what is both just and justified.
The second strategy I employ is to make it clear that all thoughtful and sincere ideas are welcome in the classroom and that students may thoughtfully and respectfully try ideas out. I attempt to create a culture where all ideas are kindly and respectfully respected to scrutiny, and where our goal is to hold ideas that stand up to such scrutiny, but where ad hominem arguments are not welcome. I treat each student as sincere and good-hearted and find that, on the whole, students respond by acting sincerely and in a good-hearted way.
Finally, especially because I am white, I endeavor to show videos and present images of non-white people whenever possible. So in discussions of racism, I have found many excellent videos of people of color articulately speaking about their own experiences of racism. I have also asked students (in small group work) to find and share with the class videos that explain different aspects of oppression. I have found that this encourages students to take responsibility for explaining and responding to forms of oppression.
In all of these examples, my aim is to foster a collaborative, inclusive space for all students to reflect on and communicate with one another about their beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions. My hope is that this is a part of the social and personal transformation that is needed for a more just society.
One final objection: one might worry that if white students experience personal transformation from their classes, they may grow complacent, feeling that the real work of racial justice was accomplished through their personal transformation. 14 One reply to this concern is that the work of overcoming racism is both personal work and societal/ institutional work. If our teaching foregrounds both of these aspects of oppression (the personal and the social/ institutional) it is clear that overcoming racism does not simply involve personal change. It also requires social and institutional change. When students see the institutional structures involved in racial hierarchies and oppression, they can also see that personal transformation is the beginning of a solution, not an end to it. But still, personal transformation is a necessary first step: before individuals can work for social and institutional change, they must commit to this work, which includes the commitment to overcome their own racism and white privilege.
Being included and feeling included are necessary precursors to learning. As teachers we foster inclusion by encouraging or requiring our students to come to class, to do the readings, and to be well prepared to engage in philosophical conversation. We do these things in order to include our students and thus facilitate their learning. But, I have argued, including all students requires more than attendance policies and reading and writing assignments. Inclusion, especially for students of color, requires the teacher's sensitivity to institutional forms of exclusion. Institutionally sanctioned exclusion can result from mascots, from the names of buildings, and from other facts of the history of our institutions; it can result from contemporary microaggressions and insensitive, ignorant questions or comments from members of our communities; and it can result from the larger culture's white supremacy, where the dominant ideals of beauty, of excellence, of who is an actor, a physician, a professor, a college student, etc., reinforce a privileging of white, Eurocentric ideals over other ideals. All of these forms of exclusion can pervade our classrooms.
Teachers of philosophy (or of other disciplines) must be sensitive to these and other forms of institutionally sanctioned exclusion if we want to cultivate fully inclusive classrooms. Cultivating an inclusive classroom first and foremost requires our sensitivity to the perspectives of our students of color. We take the first steps toward full inclusivity when we acknowledge these forms of institutional exclusion, and when we acknowledge the microaggressions they experience, and when we name the white supremacy of our culture.
But even when we are sensitive to these forms of institutional exclusion, philosophers, especially white philosophers, are uniquely situated to perpetuate other forms of exclusion as well. We perpetuate exclusive classrooms when the authors we discuss are Eurocentric, when our topics are Eurocentrically defined, when the readings we offer do not reflect a diversity of identities, and when the sideimages we present are predominantly of white people. So cultivating a fully inclusive classroom also requires our sensitivity to the issues we discuss, to the readings we offer, and to the images we present as norms. Finally, I have argued that teachers of philosophy also do well to create classrooms where white students are encouraged to examine their beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes and that these spaces are important ways to foster personal and social change. No doubt these are just first steps, but they are a place to start and a necessary one. And they are the logical extension of a teacher's commitment to a more familiar and mundane form of inclusion that we already practice. Working toward a fully inclusive classroom is an accessible way for the teacher of philosophy to work toward a new, just, social reality. The book's metaphilosophical topic is refreshingly mirrored in its argumentative structure. Bauer works in Chapters 1, 2, and 9 to model the sort of engagement with the world she believes philosophers ought to turn toward. By attending to the experiences of young women in the U.S., Bauer notices what she takes to be a strange phenomenon. Young women report that our contemporary sexual culture is simultaneously empowering and oppressive (15). Furthermore, the empowerment comes through sexual objectification and male attention, which historically many feminists have labeled oppressive forces. The female college students Bauer interacts with bask in the attention provided to them as they somewhat sadistically, as Bauer describes it, withhold pleasure from young men. But, Bauer notes, they always report providing that pleasure in the end (11). Bauer describes this state of affairs as a simultaneous gain in women's achievement as women are outperforming same-age males in educational attainment, and a continuing plague of economic insecurities and socially caused ills such as eating disorders. Our theoretical attention, Bauer argues, ought to be drawn to this contrast, which she explains in terms of a Beauvoirean ambiguity between a high-achieving female subject and an object of male attention (47).
Bauer's description is compelling, and her use of examples constitutes a greatly needed update to the philosophical literature. This is not to say that the existing literature does not make use of examples or case studies. It's standard in feminist anti-pornography discussions to attend to examples carefully selected to drive particular points. These examples focus on pornographic film stars who were sexually abused or raped while performing, or on male pornography "addicts" who are struggling with shame and disgust at the nature of their sexual desires. This is often paired with citation of the empirical literature supporting the idea that pornography is associated with a change in men's attitudes (68-69). People who defend pornography on "free speech" grounds likewise cherrypick very different empirical studies and experiences to find support for their view. Bauer intends her studies of women's experiences to move beyond these entrenched debates in order to reach a deeper understanding of the social role of these phenomena.
These chapters are an early attempt to engage in a new dialogue, and I think in certain respects they do too much and too little. Bauer describes the experiences of college students at a relatively elite American university. This is fine as one starting position, but it's likely not the area where the contrast she describes is sharpest. She describes the power young women wield as a kind of sadism. But if we moved to a discussion of the professional dominatrix, the sadism is much more clear and explicit. This is a form of sadism that is marketed and sold by young women to (often much older) men for the purposes of gaining a form of empowerment (monetary compensation and personal gratification). Many younger women who identify as sexual dominants, or who are willing to pretend as much for monetary compensation, sign up for websites such as fetlife.com or collarspace. com and offer creative, imaginative visions of female empowerment for sale to, and consumption by, men. This is not prostitution, though it can be classified as a form of sex work. The young women most often interact with men only via camera and/or email and often order the men to do embarrassing or degrading things to themselves. The cases Bauer presents incorporate these features tacitly and to a matter of degree, but the case of the professional dominatrix is one where these features are explicit and contractual. 2 The women who provide these services are clearly acting within a network of male attention, but do see themselves as being empowered and sometimes even provide a platform for radical politics.
Though these sorts of cases offer ways to expand upon the tension Bauer identifies, I think the empirical evidence on the sexual activity of young people gives us worry that Bauer may be doing too much. While "hookup culture" is very much a hot topic and Bauer is correct to point out that women now often describe their role in sexual culture through the language of empowerment, certain aspects and social effects of hookup culture appear to be on the decline in the United States. An overview by the Guttmacher Institute, for example, shows declines in teen pregnancy, increases in STI prevention methods, and delayed onset of sexual activity among American teenagers compared to previous decades. 3 And so we have reason to ask the further question of why it is that the sexual activity of young women is such a hot topic in an environment where they're less likely to do it. Hookup culture is a topic that affects many people in a negative way, but perhaps not as much as in past decades. Insofar as it has negative effects today, these effects might be as much a product of the way we collectively talk about hooking up as it is a product of the way we go about hooking up.
In Chapter 3, Bauer contrasts this complex picture taken from young women's experiences to the much more morally focused picture from feminist critique. She points out that terms like "obscene" and "hardcore pornography" are inherently normative terms tied to worldviews (25-26). She cites in particular feminist anti-pornography figures, like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who skillfully use terminology such as "objectification" in order to move men to disgust and shame at their arousal at female subservience (pp. 3, 33). Bauer does not think feminist philosophers have demonstrated an ability to match the power of this analysis because in using the methods of philosophy they rob these terms of their normative force (27). On this point, Bauer extensively discusses Martha Nussbaum's analysis of sexual objectification. Bauer finds unhelpful the way Nussbaum grounds objectification in Kantian moral theory and expands the term into a fundamentally gender-neutral analysis (34-37). She argues that because Nussbaum no longer places gender subordination in a position central to the analysis of objectification, she cancels the usefulness of the concept of objectification to feminist political projects.
Chapters 5-7 constitute Bauer's main contributions to the pornography debate and form the point of entry for her reimagination of the philosophy of J. L. Austin. Bauer's Austin was not the philosophical reformist who admonishes philosophers to take up the project of linguistic pragmatics. Rather, he was a philosophical revolutionary who advised philosophers to start by attending to what people do with words. He begins by asking himself about his own experience with words, what he would say when, and moves on to compare this work to the experiences of others in order to generate insights (53-55). In this way, Bauer's Austin believes that the social role of speech, how we do things with words, is theoretically prior to philosophical work about syntax and semantics. What is much more interesting is the project of getting at how we use words to take and shift responsibility for our actions (59-61).
She applies this reading of Austin to Langton's articulation of the claim that pornography subordinates and silences women. She thinks Langton's articulation of this claim, which makes use of J. L. Austin qua theorist of pragmatics, fails to gain political traction. While I do not intend to fully review Langton's argument here, a quick summary is that pornography subordinates women by judging them inferior to men and legitimating this view through social convention. It silences women by removing the background conditions they need to assert sexual refusal and the negation of their subordinate status. It rearranges conventional social roles in such a way that it blocks uptake of women's speech, and it uses its cultural authority to rig the game and define relations between the sexes. 4 One area where Bauer finds Langton's analysis to come up short is in the discussion of authority. As Bauer presents Langton, her claims are conditional on establishing that pornography has the authority to subordinate and silence women. However, Bauer does not believe Langton has given an adequate account of how this authority works in practice. While Langton needs to argue for the claim that pornography has the authority to fix conventions (79), Bauer believes that what pornography actually does is highlight and operate upon existing desires (80-82).
I think Bauer's reading of Austin is powerful and well applied. However, I do suspect that critics of pornography have a promising story to tell that Bauer mentions only briefly. Bauer introduces the idea that pornography's authority may work through absolving men, collectively and individually, of responsibility for their actions. While Bauer is correct that Langton herself has not focused on this type of view, this is akin to the sort of view that many feminist activists are developing when speaking about "rape culture." Though a somewhat nebulous term, I take it that "rape culture" refers to widespread attitudes, beliefs, and actions that act in order to undermine the notion that men are responsible for rape and other forms of sexual assault. Developing this idea is a project very much in line with what Bauer's Austin advises. Of course, and I suspect Bauer would respond along these lines, it's far from clear what role pornography, specifically, plays in this sort of system. This role is likely not large.
Interestingly, in Chapters 7 and 8 Bauer tries to generalize this discussion of authority to talk about feminist philosophy, and then all of philosophy, as a whole. If philosophers are to use their position to advance political critique, it's important, Bauer argues, to self-reflectively examine the authority to which philosophers appeal in their own work. What Bauer finds is that philosophers appeal to the authority of reason (116-117) to rank certain philosophical claims as inferior and to legitimate different philosophical claims (125-128). While pornography is again her example, she believes this is a more widely applicable point, arguing that this appeal to the authority of reason is not likely to move people. She delves deeper by distinguishing between two traditional sources of philosophers' claims to authority, namely, a Great Man/magisterial approach that rests on the idea that a handful of (generally white, universally male) philosophers lead the way for the field, and a scientistic approach honed in early twentieth-century Europe that divides the field into individual problems solved by teams of researchers (138-140). Bauer believes that the job of the philosopher is to encourage and lead people to think (117-118) and that neither approach is optimal for this goal.
For the scientistic model, Bauer appeals to the pressure to publish philosophical work. Publishing in an increasingly specialized field is often not conducive with taking the time to do genuine outreach work and making philosophy intelligible (144-147). She appeals secondly to philosophy's track record of gender and racial representation among professional philosophers, tracing this lack of representation in part to a historical model of the "Great Man" of philosophy and in part to a macho culture among philosophers. While I find philosophy's track record on representation to be miserable and embarrassing, I find this argument to be rather underdeveloped. In particular, I think this chapter could have been improved by further, more explicit reflection on just how and why it is that setting aside these approaches will help philosophy become more engaged and overcome its problems of representation. I suspect empirical researchers on these topics may be able to help fill in the gaps here by, e.g., studying particular implementations and their effects.
This book fills an important gap in the existing philosophical literature. The kind of meta-philosophical reflection Bauer engages in is difficult to perform in a profession that has increasingly turned toward much more narrowly defined concerns, and whose interdisciplinary model has often resulted in more effective engagement with the sciences than with the humanities. Tying this material together with a reading of J. L. Austin is a brilliant move, and one cannot fail to learn a great deal about what Austin was really up to by reading Bauer's overview and applications. This book is very much a generative project, with Bauer leaving the reader with many interesting ways to continue this work. 
Reviewed by Maurice Hamington
PORTL AND STATE UNIVERSIT Y, MAURICE4@PDX.EDU
Despite the growing body of work on care ethics, some philosophers who are steeped in the analytic tradition of philosophy find it difficult to identify what is uniquely of value in care ethics. For example, professor of philosophy and healthcare Stephen D. Edwards of Swansea University suggests that there is little difference between care ethics and principalism, concluding, "when each is characterized sympathetically they may even turn out to be one and the same theory." 1 Contributing to this confusion is the relative "youth" of care ethics, only being labeled three decades ago, as well as the variety of disciplines including feminist theory, philosophy, political theory, education theory, and health care theory that are attempting to define and shape care ethics. Stephanie Collins, lecturer in political theory at the University of Manchester, UK, wrote The Core of Care Ethics to clarify and distinguish care ethics to an analytical audience. Collins expresses a desire to "use the tools of analytic philosophy to specify, unify, and justify these normative commitments [of care ethics], in a way that sheds new light on the theory" (1) and "to bring care ethics into the mainstream of analytic theory" (2).
True to her promise, Collins brings a comprehensive knowledge of contemporary care theorists 2 to bear in a systematic analysis of the normative claims of care ethics. The first half of The Core of Care Ethics is a survey of the care ethics literature in service of drawing out four generally common normative commitments among theorists: 1) Ethical theory should positively endorse deliberation involving sympathy and direct attendance to concrete particulars (33, 82).
2) To the extent that they have value to individuals in the relationship, relationships ought to be (a) treated as moral paradigms, (b) valued, preserved, or promoted (as appropriate to the circumstance at hand), and (c) acknowledged as giving rise to weighty duties (47, 82).
3) Care ethics sometimes calls for morally valuable caring about (64).
4) Care ethics sometimes calls for morally valuable caring actions (80).
Collins meticulously works out the above claims from the existing literature but is dissatisfied with the results as too loosely affiliated. She claims, "we can do better" and in the second half of the book sets out to offer "claims that will remove their ad hoc and vague appearance" (83).
Part II of The Core of Care Ethics delineates Collins' distinctive contribution to care ethics through what she refers to as the "dependency principal." Collins describes the dependency principal as part of the family of moral claims, arguing that if one is capable of helping someone in need and can do so at not too great a cost, one has the duty to do so (97). Ultimately, Collins views care as a response to dependency. Although she provides logically integrated and detailed claims, her simplified version of the dependency principal is "agent A has a moderately strong dependency duty to take measure M when A's most efficacious measure for fulfilling an important interest is sufficiently likely to fulfill the interest and would realize positive expected value regarding agent and dependent" (122-123). This analytic approach is indicative of the precision and clarity that Collins endeavors to achieve in her presentation (although I found the two-page index frustratingly truncated for tracking down concepts in Collins' intricate threads of thought).
For Collins, the dependency principal is the heretofore missing "slogan" of care ethics (1-3, 99, 170). In an interesting twist, Collins' hopes for The Core of Care Ethics include both the scrupulous delineation of formulaic analytic moral precision as well as a general slogan akin to the shorthand descriptors of utilitarian and Kantian ethics. The slogan Collins offers is that "dependency relationships generate duties" (169). Although centering care ethics on relationships is consistent with the work of scholars in the field, it is the role of duties which likely might draw the most scrutiny from among theorists.
The positive intellectual contributions of The challenge for such an approach is that it loses a sense of the whole and it cannot recognize radical departures in thinking about morality or paradigm shifts. Care ethics has normative implications, but to understand care separate from its ontological and epistemological underpinnings is to place artificial structure and category above the reality of the interconnection of human experience. 3 Consider, for example, the act of deep or active listening. In the process of authentically listening to another individual, one may learn something about the other, which may motivate a caring act or fine-tune caring action. Listening as such is a form of inquiry; however, it is also perceived by the one being listened to as a caring act. Does listening qualify as a normative in Collins' framework? Is it epistemological? Or is this a reinforcement of my relational, performative being and thus ontological? Some have claimed that care has a postmodern element to it and thus does not easily fit neatly into traditional philosophical categories. As Susan Hekman claimed about Carol Gilligan's formulation of care ethics many years ago, "she is introducing a new interpretation of the moral realm, which wholly reconstitutes it." As part of an analytic trajectory, Collins claims that care can be captured through abstractions (3). As Collins points out, many care theorists have resisted abstractions. This is another case where the categorical limits of language fail us. Care theorists do indeed theorize about care so there is some level of abstraction, but the return to the messiness of experience is never far away. Although Collins recognizes the role of women's experience in the development of care ethics (7), the elevation of abstraction over human experience to placate analytic demands results in clarity but at a significant loss of completeness. An analytic understanding of care ethics is reminiscent of John Dewey's Gifford Lectures where he expresses concern about the quest for certainty in philosophy. One of Dewey's criticisms was that in the quest for certainty, theories tended to "assume that the conclusions of reflective inference must be capable of reduction to things known if they are to be proved." 5 The core of care ethics as dependency relations engenders duties appears reductionist in its truth and strips care of meaningful interphase with action and experience. Dewey's vision of philosophy, which in this case coincides well with feminist philosophy, is one where means and ends are not entirely discrete: "Philosophy is called upon to be a theory of the practice, through ideas sufficiently definite to be operative in experimental endeavor, by which the integration may be made secure in actual experience." 6 An American pragmatist approach to understanding the normative elements of care ethics might have a more robust engagement than an analytic one because it is less concerned with delimiting means and ends.
The Core of Care Ethics' goal of bringing analytic philosophers into conversation with care theorists is praiseworthy. Analytic approaches have ascended to occupy the dominant intellectual position in Western philosophy and theory, as witnessed in the personnel of North American philosophy departments. However, one should not confuse an analytic approach to care with a comprehensive understanding of care. At times, Collins appears to elide translating care for the benefit of analytic philosophers with offering a better understanding of care ethics for everyone, and these two goals should not be confused. For example, the following paragraph moves from addressing analytic audiences to making more sweeping claims:
If care ethics is to be maximally appealing from an analytic point of view, there should be some unified core within the apparent disjointedness, and a way of rendering the indeterminancies determinant. If these four claims [summarized above] can be unified, specified, and explained by one core idea, then this will provide guidance in interpreting the claims of care ethics and applying them to issues in the real world. It would allow care ethicists to distinguish themselves from non-care ethicists and to determine whether new proposals in care ethics are true to the guiding idea. It would also allow them to appropriately constrain their theory's upshots. (87) Note how the aims shift from the beginning of the paragraph to the end of the paragraph. I find the move from the analytic voice to the sense of intellectual control and discipline very worrisome. Intellectually, I am not sure who are the "upshots" that require constraining. Feminist theory and philosophy has had to struggle with disciplinary marginalization, and yet care ethics has emerged as one of many important intellectual innovations of feminism. To replicate theoretical hegemonic boundaries on care ethics seems disingenuous to its origin, purpose, and history.
Collins strives to leave out the peripheral claims of care ethics (13). However, ontological and epistemological claims including their emotional dimensions are not peripheral to care ethics. It would be as if I am going to explain who you are by providing a detailed description of your function at work. That description may be very precise, revealing, and true, but it fails to capture the totality of who you are (and misses how your home life affects who you are). Although Collins is clear about not addressing all aspects of care, it is uncertain that the normative dimension of care can be disentangled from the whole of care experience. Similarly, the dependency principle understood as the notion that relationships give rise to duties rings of normative truth but leaves out so much about what makes care theory so robust and attractive. As long as a sense of proportionality is applied to 
Reviewed by Graham Parsons
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, GRAHAM.PARSONS@USMA.EDU
In Love and War Tom Digby has achieved something rare. He has produced a book by a philosopher on gender and militarism that is nevertheless a short, fun read. It is filled with insights and observations that invest the reader emotionally and provoke personal reflection. It is a fine piece of public philosophy that should be of interest far beyond academia.
Digby seeks to expose a problem in heterosexual relationships which affects everyone, not just straight people. He speaks directly to those he aims to influence, not to academics. Digby hopes to open "whole new possibilities for men and women to love each otheras partners and spouses, as friends, as colleagues and coworkers, as neighbors" (189). To achieve this, Digby avoids abstraction and instead draws us into his project by using illustrations from the news and popular culture. At the heart of the book is a vision of what we might call tragic heterosexuality. For Digby, tragic heterosexuality derives ultimately from a gender binary that divides humans into the categories of men and women while prescribing for men the dominant role of warrior/protector and for women the submissive role of nurturer/breeder. These disparate roles require disparate capacities between the genders. According to Digby, the crucial capacity that warrior men must have is the ability to manage the capacity to care about the suffering of themselves and others. Warrior men must be emotionally tough; they must be able to "suck it up." In other words, they have to be able to distance themselves emotionally from human suffering so that they can efficiently hurt people, including themselves. The crucial capacity that nurturer/breeder women must have is in some ways the inverse of the warrior man: they must have a heightened capacity to care for others. They must be submissive and devoted caregivers, highly responsive to the needs of those they are intimate with, especially their male sexual partners and children.
This gender binary renders heterosexual relationships transactional. Men are expected to provide to women the means of successful procreation in the form of sexual virility and viable sperm as well as protection of the household. Women are expected to provide to men devoted love, nurturing care, submissiveness, and children. One's honor as a man or woman depends on how well one can provide these things to one's heterosexual partner as well as how well one receives these things from them. Failures at either end deeply threaten one's self-worth. The transactional character of this type of relationship is often made explicit as men and women will discuss ways to get the "best deal" from the "opposite" sex.
Digby identifies a cultural attitude toward masculine violence and confrontation which grows out of the gender binary that he calls cultural militarism (78). Cultural militarism is the presumption that 1) there are always enemies who threaten our society, 2) hence adversariality with other societies is inevitable, 3) hence war is often necessary or desirable, and 4) war is mainly a job for men. The basic thrust of these presumptions is that masculine violence is good or useful. Cultural militarism explains much of our military policy such as the counterproductive wars the US has attempted to wage and threatens to continue to wage in response to terrorist attacks. Moreover, cultural militarism reinforces the adversarial character of heteronormative love prescribed by the gender binary.
The attempt to instill in men the capacity to manage care about human suffering and the requirement that they be dominant is, for Digby, the ultimate source of the tragedy here. For this reason, Digby spends several chapters discussing the ways masculinity is policed and its effects on men and society. This is the most rewarding aspect of the book. From a very early age, boys are taught to "be tough," which means precisely that they should pride themselves on their physical and emotional domination of others and their lack of regard for the feelings or needs of others. Crucially, the demand to "be tough" is enforced relationally. That is, the qualities of the warrior/protector are valorized by denigrating any failure to attain them as feminine. For boys and men the worst thing that could be said about them is that they are womanly. Thus, misogyny is in the very DNA of masculinity. It is this that makes heterosexual love inherently adversarial, according to Digby. This is all very bad for women. They are perpetually the victims of oppression in its various forms. But it is also very bad for men and here Digby makes a significant contribution. The demand for "toughness" is psychologically crippling. It is a myth that people can be what men are expected to be: uncaring, dispassionate, solitary. In order to come close to this ideal, men must dissociate from central aspects of their psyches. That is to say, they must attempt to be what they are not. Moreover, the aspects of themselves they try to dissociate from are seen by them as unacceptable weaknesses, i.e., as womanly. This sentences men to a horrible fate. They can never fully integrate themselves and they will be forever filled with shameful secrets that they are terrified might be discovered by others. Men must live in what Digby calls a citadel made of fear (72).
This makes intimacy with others, especially women, deeply problematic for men. At the same time as they need to be loved by women, especially their wives and girlfriends, they cannot actually share themselves with women for fear of being rejected as unmanly. Warrior men simply cannot have fulfilling, loving relationships with women or anyone else. And, certainly, women will forever be frustrated if they are looking for intimate relationships with warrior men.
Digby argues that the inadequacy of the model of heterosexual love underpinning the gender binary is only increasing. This is because the need of men and women, but especially women, to engage in the classic heteronormative "transaction" is dwindling. Women are becoming less reliant on men. Importantly, they are becoming more economically independent and as a result their interest in having children with men is declining. This makes it harder for men to affirm their masculinity as breadwinners and procreators. Moreover, the traditional warrior role is no longer widely available to men. The prevalence of military service has declined across most developed societies and even if one serves, the kind of work one will do is less likely to affirm the traditional warrior identity. All in all, we don't need breadwinners, procreators, and warriors. Nevertheless we still enforce the gender binary, and this leaves men with few ways to achieve the roles we condition them to serve.
We have produced what Digby calls a "dangerous masculinity cocktail" (102). Men, in order to affirm their masculinity, turn to alternative and increasingly destructive outlets. Digby's most disturbing passages describe some of the forms this can take. Lifelike sex dolls, gonzo porn, violent and misogynistic videogames, macho sports, gang violence, gun culture, and mass shootings are some examples.
Digby also offers a theory of the origins of tragic heterosexuality and cultural militarism. According to Digby, not all societies rely on war to resolve problems with other societies. Such pacifistic societies do not foster the tragic gender binary. However, societies that rely on war will exhibit tragic heterosexuality. This is because the cultivation of tragic heterosexuality is an effective means for a society to manage the burdens of frequent war. Warreliant societies need a lot of people who can effectively engage in combat, i.e., warriors, and because they will have members frequently killed in war, they also need to have proficient breeders. As it takes comparatively few men to maintain a high rate of reproduction, it makes sense to assign the role of warrior to men and the role of breeder/ nurturer to women. Hence, war-reliant societies find utility in the gender binary and tragic heterosexuality. So long as societies continue to be war reliant, tragic heterosexuality will live on.
It is here that Digby finds reason to think we can and are overcoming the pull of tragic heterosexuality. Given the nature of what is currently the most urgent national security threat, i.e., the threat of terrorism, and the types of response it requires, the utility of warrior masculinity is decreasing. Thwarting terrorism is not achieved by means of conventional warfare. Killing terrorists is not going to end the threat of terrorism. In fact, a conventional military response will likely increase the threat of terrorism. The United States, for instance, has learned this slowly over the course of the decade and a half since 9/11. This discovery is evident in the changes the U.S. made in its counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, there is no longer the same need for warrior masculinity as there may have been in the past. This opens the door for a challenge to the gender binary. Digby sees evidence of the challenge underway already. An increased sensitivity to the needs of soldiers, an aversion to casualties, and the inclusion of women in combat signal a gradual degendering of war.
This seems too optimistic to me. Digby may be right about the effective ways of responding to terrorism, but it is not so clear how widely agreement with his view has spread. Given the belligerent proposals for responding to the Islamic State out there (Donald Trump's suggestion to summarily execute members with bullets dipped in pig's blood comes to mind), it seems a traditional warrior response to terrorism still has a lot of traction. More importantly, though, I am not convinced that the gender binary ever had the kind of social utility Digby suggests that it did. On Digby's view, war reliance would seem to precede the gender binary and cultural militarism. But there is reason to see them as more intimately connected than this. For cultural militarism itself fosters a reliance on war.
Culturally militaristic societies have, as Digby claims, a faith in masculine violence. This leads them to react to conflict militaristically. It wouldn't seem to matter to such societies if militaristic responses to conflict in fact prolong conflict. Peace is not seen as a realistic goal in such societies. In turn, they will be war reliant and see utility in the gender binary even if such things are contrary to the interests of peace. Perhaps tragic heterosexuality, cultural militarism, and war reliance should be thought of as a self-reinforcing system of militarism that is not so easy to dislodge rather than as a tiered structure with war reliance at the base. Reviewed by Nancy J. Matchett
Women in Philosophical Counseling: The Anima of Thought in Action
UNIVERSIT Y OF NORTHERN COLORADO, NANCY.MATCHETT@UNCO.EDU
Philosophers are doing quite a bit of hand-wringing about our discipline these days. Some of this is over the relative absence of female voices in the academic profession and some over the extent to which philosophy can or should be understood as a practical pursuit. Women in Philosophical Counseling brings these two concerns together, yet does not engage in or encourage more hand-wringing. Instead, the 18 contributors, from 13 countries, share their experiences of putting philosophy to practical use.
The book, which is organized into five main parts, offers what co-editor Luisa dePaola calls "a virtual journey in philosophical counseling" (5). Part I affords readers the experience of "Listening to Whispers" from people whose voices are frequently overlooked: clients who are especially vulnerable and philosophical counselors working outside academia. Two of its four selections describe philosophical work with clients: Turkish women who "feel, and/or are, controlled, abused or manipulated most of the time" (Moryahim, 16), and terminally ill patients whose hunger for meaning is "great, urgent and intense" (Sesino, 52). Both contexts produce experiences of loneliness and isolation that result from external circumstances largely beyond the clients' control. Hence philosophy might be thought to have little to offer them, especially if identified with abstract thinking and didactic instruction. But the attentive reader can hear how they learn to articulate authentic feelings and thoughts. Philosophical inquiry boosts self-esteem, enabling women in Turkey "to set clear boundaries" and deal with "their concrete and difficult problems in increasingly sophisticated ways" (Moryahim, 21, 24). And philosophical reflection affords terminally ill persons "the chance to experience their own identity at a deeper level" (Sesino, 52). Importantly, these benefits are not the result of top-down applications of a counselor's preferred theory or method; rather, they result from exposure to "a wide range of philosophical perspectives and tools" (Moryahim, 24), each of which is suggested by a counselor-as-dialog partner, that is, a philosopher who is not only familiar with a wide range of potentially relevant concepts and theories, but skilled at "listening to a person" (Sesino, 53).
The specifically philosophical yet nonetheless therapeutic benefits of careful listening are the focus of the two other selections. Radovanovic-a school counselor in Serbia, where there is little support for mental health-suggests that the willingness of all therapists to explore a variety of different approaches is the only way to overcome the fear and social prejudice of asking for help. And Bakirdjian-a researcher and philosophical counselor working in Argentina, where philosophical counseling is more established-stresses the importance of understanding each client's primary motivation, "given that he/she is not merely the passive guest invited to this banquet [of philosophical thinking], but the main protagonist in his/her own recovery" (Bakirdjian, 43).
Part II illustrates the therapeutic benefits of "Enhancing Doubt," and the common theme among its four chapters is that "doubt is not a paralyzing state of indecisiveness or a difficulty in assessing a given state of affairs, but rather an existential opening to the situations in which people find themselves from time to time" (dePaola, 284). That doubt can be valuable is uncontroversial to anyone with an interest in philosophy, yet the first two selections question whether doubt has been accurately conceptualized within the discipline. Instead of following Descartes in viewing doubt as a way to clear the ground for certainty, Salaverria contends that "doubts generate something new about us, about our relation to the world and thus, generate something new in the world itself" (69). Similarly, Amir shows how "humor as a tool in the practice of philosophy" makes it possible for women to counter the emotions of disgust and shame that result from "interiorizing" the association of women with vulnerability, bodily functions, and the like (83). By exploiting various ambiguities in how women (and especially women's bodies) are viewed, humor shows that it is literally impossible to take the claims that ground those emotions seriously. Yet rather than demanding the ambiguity be resolved, humor allows us to accept-and even take pleasure in-human ambivalence about the body. The final two selections take contrasting (though not contradictory) positions on the value of psychological understandings of human nature. Gruengard draws from case studies in her own practice to show why she doubts that psychological analyses of women's "need to be needed" are accurate and whether this "need" can be an authentic expression of women's values (Ch. 7). Kreimer also doubts the extent to which people should listen to their natural or biological urges, though she does not doubt that they are part of us. Focusing specifically on "several irrational sources" that have been shown by empirical psychology to influence mate choice (121), she argues that men and women who visit her practice "are often 'deceived,' not by their partner but by [these] unconscious biological, psychological, and social factors" (128). Fortunately, philosophical counseling can help clients make more fulfilling relationship choices, not only by making these implicit urges explicit, but by enabling them to re-conceptualize love "as an art, as something we learn and improve on, not just something that happens to us" (121). So Kreimer's case study, like Gruengard's, serves to illustrate how doubt can facilitate concrete problem solving.
The first two parts of the book emphasize how philosophical counseling promotes epistemic humility and opens up space for clients to navigate life's problems with greater flexibility. Sometimes this is enough to resolve a client's problems. But few life problems are the result of mistaken assumptions and narrow patterns of reasoning alone; in many cases, what is needed is a radically new way of conceptualizing the situations in which we find ourselves, even ways of re-conceptualizing ourselves. This latter, more constructive activity is the focus of Part III, "Thinking Emotions," which is really about overcoming dualisms of all kinds. Interestingly, both contributors are from Norway, where philosophical counseling is quite well-established, and neither is a model of humility in its traditionally female guise. Vahl not only challenges the historical assumption that emotions should be subservient to reason, but asks "when is our reasoning rational? When are our inferences rational? When is the use of logic rational? And which emotions are involved in these processes in order for them to be rational?" (139) She also draws freely from work in the social sciences in order to formulate her answerswe are rational "when our cognitive functions work appropriately with our emotional functions," and respect and empathy are essential to "integrating or finding a good balance between emotions and cognition" (ibid.)-thereby challenging the supposed distinction between philosophy and other disciplines too. In a similar vein, Angeltun draws on both Martin Heidegger and Carol Gilligan while defending phronesis as the core of all philosophical work. "To engage a world 'phronetically' is . . . an attempt to understand its possibilities for relations and action as it 'happens'" (152) and "depends on a process involving feelings and rationality" (154). Moreover, since caring is a basic structure of being-in-the-world, "it is important to pay attention to the psychological tensions and the implications which follow when emotions and actions are at odds" (155). Like Vahl, Angeltun forcefully challenges the picture of philosophy as objective theorizing that must be detached from basic human longings and day-to-day concerns. And she defends the work of philosophical counselors as people who "train to develop context sensitivity and to really listen and investigate the guests' [aka clients'] experienced situations, moral dilemmas, relationships, feelings, and thoughts. From this context sensitivity we search for relevant philosophical thoughts from our educational background that can shed some light or challenge the guests' perspectives" (Angeltun, 154).
The upshot of Parts I-III is that philosophical counselors (as a group) are just like academic philosophers (as a group) in terms of sensitivity to philosophical problems, knowledge of prior philosophical theorizing, and skill in theoryconstruction. Where they differ is in their interest in problems that emerge from clients' own experiences, willingness to allow clients to "co-construct" philosophical responses through dialog, and conception of philosophical problems as being solved only when clients are able "to think their emotions and feel their thoughts" (dePaola, 288-89). The rest of the the book highlights these differences from two different angles: "Sharing Insights" about how philosophical counseling leads to growth and new ideas, for both clients and counselors, and hence is continuous with academic or scholarly pursuits (Part IV), and detailing how philosophical counselors are "Acting to Change" current paradigms of both clinical psychology and psychiatry (Part V). Five of the eight contributors work primarily as counselors, the other three as academics. The academics are especially critical of philosophical paradigms that favor a particular account of a problem rather than emphasizing the more general need for coherence. After all, while "we may never actually finish the project of producing such an account, . . . the activity of its production, no matter how large or how small a portion of our waking life it consumes . . . is crucial to a satisfying human life" (Piety, 213). And the counselors are particularly keen to show how gender inequality and skepticism about philosophical counseling arise in any context where "the neutral posture, the objective viewpoint of the knower-the non-situated, distanced standpoint-is valued higher than the particular standpoint of the situated viewer who works 'in the field' and who obtains philosophical insight through communication and interpersonal dialogue" (Moors, 234). The combined result is a persuasive case that "while there is nothing wrong with the pursuit of abstract or productive knowledge, . . . there is something wrong when it is out of balance with our concern and responsibility for others" (Douglas, 276).
The book, which merits attention from anyone with an interest in the nature and value of philosophy, also serves as "a point of departure for engaging philosophical counselors with the question of différance" (dePaola, 3). Readers are engaged with this question from the earliest pages, since each co-editor takes a slightly different stance in their individually written introductions. According to Raabe, " [t] here is no doubt that women and men are equal. . . . But being equal doesn't mean being the same" (1). Still, both psychological research and his own counseling experience convince him that "it's sometimes acceptable to generalize" (ibid.)-namely, when doing so enables the counselor to more accurately discern how a client initially perceives his or her problems and hence to respond more directly to each client's most immediate needs. While equally keen to facilitate genuine dialog, dePaola is more wary of what generalizations may obscure. This is grounded in her experience of being "taught"-though never explicitly-that women were not philosophers. dePaola's main objection is to a "one size fits all model" of philosophy (5), and Raabe is keen to point out that biological differences are "not always as clear and distinct as social convention would have us believe" (Raabe, 2). Not surprisingly, the book they have put together shows contributors grappling with the question of difference in myriad ways.
The editors also have a more political goal "to encourage every reader to invest in and capitalize on philosophical resources as they seek out and develop their uniquely different way of life" (dePaola, 5). To my mind, this is admirably achieved. Each essay serves to illustrate a particular author's "uniquely different" approach to doing philosophy, and many show how a philosophical approach to counseling enables clients to live happier, more thoughtful, and more productive lives. Collectively, the essays demonstrate that The Anima of Thought in Action has much greater philosophical import than those who ignore or seek to abstract from human vulnerability, bodily experience, emotional responsiveness, and interpersonal engagement have typically acknowledged or been willing to accept. And they also show that by engaging with concrete human problems, we can achieve that measure of transcendence that has long been one of philosophy's most cherished aims.
Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard
Jill Stauffer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 240 pages. Hardcover, $55. ISBN: 0231171501.
Reviewed by Grayson Hunt
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSIT Y GRAYSON.HUNT@WKU.EDU
Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard is a small book with immense breadth and insight into the difficulties of and harms incurred through the process of political reconciliation in the aftermath of atrocity. Stauffer's book is part of a growing philosophical literature on transitional justice by feminist theorists. 1 While much of the research in this discipline is informed by legal and political theory, Stauffer's approach to reconciliation is decidedly ethical and interdisciplinary. Her focus on Levinasian phenomenology and existentialism is paired with a serious engagement with empirical research about the efficacy and outcomes of criminal and testimonial approaches to reconciliation. The result is a work of moral theory that, with its emphasis on responsiveness and intersubjectivity, offers a decidedly feminist approach to justice.
Stauffer's work extends other conversations within European philosophy and holocaust studies with her engagement with two central figures, both victims of the Jewish Holocaust. I say victims because although both survived (Levinas was a prisoner of war; Améry was tortured and held at work camps at Auschwitz), there is a real sense in which Améry in particular did not survive; he experienced what many call a "social death" before his suicide in 1978. This insight is key to Stauffer's argument; Améry's social death is a feature of having been abandoned. Ethical Loneliness offers a careful meditation on a basic social abandonment that is often at the heart of (and yet unarticulated in) other works on transitional justice. Stauffer's work also engages smaller enclaves within the broader context of ethics and transitional justice. Stauffer is an expert of Jean Améry's philosophy and literature, and the care with which she treats Améry and Levinas (both persecuted Jewish thinkers, like Primo Levi) brings to mind a dark emotional style of W. G. Sebald. 2 Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard effectively and beautifully argues that survivors of atrocity are owed more than can be afforded by criminal courts and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (hereafter TRCs). Survivors deserve to be heard, and not being heard is the source of an injustice that Stauffer describes as a form of acute social abandonment. Ethical loneliness is neither aloneness nor solitude. Whereas when one feels aloneness or solitude, one can still rely on broad social supports, "ethical loneliness is the experience of being abandoned by humanity compounded by the experience of not being heard" (9). This form of social abandonment is widespread, Stauffer argues, and is caused not just by oppression, but the failure of just-minded people to hear well (2) . From this failure Stauffer derives an ethical duty to respond to the stories of injustice as told by victims and survivors. The two standard approaches to transitional justice-criminal courts and TRCs-fail to hear well and therefore cannot undo ethical loneliness. Stauffer's ethical alternative-the capacity to hear well-is intersubjective in essence and introduces a novel type of responsibility beyond culpability.
Approaching responsibility not as the culpability of the autonomous self but rather as the duty to respond follows from Stauffer's careful development of the Levinasian notion of subjectivity as one's subjection to other human beings (23). Rejecting the Kantian picture of autonomy, "Levinas gives us a subject formed in heteronomy and responsible to others long before freedom is possible" (23). With vulnerability centered as the condition of possibility for subjectivity (a move feminist philosophers would later prize), Stauffer takes it a step further, claiming that "self formation is like trauma" because it disrupts a fantasy of autonomy (24). Stauffer begins with this foundational notion of "finite freedom" in order to help her readers understand what ethical loneliness is and how such social abandonment reveals a social responsibility that goes beyond individual culpability (that which is available and prioritized when we view subjectivity as autonomous).
The first chapter, "Ethical Loneliness," starts with the definition of the term, developed in the introduction through a series of philosophical vignettes meant to draw out the affective contours of the phenomenology of ethical loneliness. Together, the vignettes, titled "Stories," "Dependence," "Destruction," and "The Self," conclude that if selves and worlds are "cooperatively authored achievements," then we are all responsible (not just as perpetrators or victims) for rebuilding destroyed lives. Stauffer envisions ethics and law that move beyond the liberal political philosophy's obsession with consent and culpability in favor of responsibility.
The second chapter, "Repair," offers an overview of the various approaches to repair (criminal trials and TRCs) and examines their strengths and limitations. These standard methods are temporal approaches to justice: criminal courts are largely retributive, looking backwards in order to punish; truth and reconciliation commissions are largely restorative, looking forward in order to envision a community reconciled. Stauffer's point in this chapter is that these two approaches aren't best suited to repair ethical loneliness (criminal trials rarely rely on victim testimony, TRCs collect victim testimony but don't prosecute). "Survivors," she says, "want their losses to be recognized [not fixed] and their willingness or unwillingness to forgive accepted as justified" (66). To demonstrate the failures of the TRCs and criminal courts, Stauffer turns to a tension between hope and fact, or idealism and empirical evidence. Philosophical approaches give us tools, says Stauffer, to "project a better world," and yet philosophers must also look out for evidence of the "inevitable human shortcomings of the initial projections" (61). Stauffer worries that when anecdote and hope (the ingredients of Truth and Reconciliation commissions) are left unchecked by empirical data, the idealist projections of better futures can set up expectations that "may not be borne out by the reality of lives or proceedings" (61). To illustrate this ethical point about how empirical data can and should be used to help better the idealist projection of better futures, Stauffer notes how quantifying witness and victim/survivor responses to the process is key to mitigating harmful misconceptions about the process. For example, there are studies showing that witnesses are shocked to find out that the crimes in question are against the state and that there is little need for input from those harmed by the crime.
In Chapter 3, "Hearing," Stauffer introduces the concept of reparative reading as the kind of hearing that acknowledges and responds to ethical loneliness and acts as the antidote to the fact that courts and TRCs do not and cannot create a demand for communities to adequately hear and respond to ethical loneliness. Being able to talk and heal requires a responsive audience-an insight Stauffer borrows from American feminist philosopher Susan Brison in her account of recovery from sexual violence in Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of the Self (2003) . In Stauffer's words, "If we have stories to tell and no one listens, we may have been robbed of our stories" (105). Stauffer engages a series of stories recounted by survivors in order to illustrate how people who have lived safe lives can fail to hear what the narratives of horror convey (even when they truly listen). 3 This chapter is not about criminal culpability, but the failure of "allies." The question asked in Chapter 3 is "how might those of us who care to listen learn to hear better?" (109). This is where the feminist epistemological import of Stauffer's work shines through: "In listening, she should be ready to hear things that don't accord with her expectations, things she doesn't want to hear, even things that threaten and destroy her idea of how the world works. She will have to be disarmed" (110). 4 In the fourth chapter, revision is defended as a human capacity to live the past in the ways that make the present more livable. Stauffer is particularly interested in how "revisionary practices" arise out of the complex relationships between resentment, forgiveness, time, and recovery in the context of political reconciliation.
5 Améry famously defended his resentments during a period of state-sanctioned reconciliation as a principled revolt against socially mandated forgiveness and the social complacency that the goal of forgiveness brought with it. 6 Stauffer argues in this chapter that when we unreflectively adopt legalism to decide responsibility, we lose sight of how the entire community-legal practitioners, victims, perpetrators, bystanders, theorists of law or politics, and people who simply care about justice-has a duty to respond to the resentments of victims like Améry. Instead, the legal model renders collective progress and survivors' struggle with the past irreconcilable.
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In the fifth chapter, Stauffer raises a concern that many critical political theorists have raised before: namely, that the Anglo-Christian approach to the South African TRC imposes Western standards of autonomy, and, in doing so, conceals from view other ways of understanding trauma and harm in conversations about just desert.
8 Stauffer frames the problem in practical ethical language in a section called "Responsibility Beyond Culpability." In her discussion of the need to hear, she says, "what will matter in many settings is whether the people who will listen will, while listening well to what is being said, also listen for moments when it is clear that something is not being heard" (165). The question, phrased differently, is How can we listen better so that what's not being heard can also be noticed? To illustrate the stakes of this riddle, Stauffer discusses how Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu's use of the Christian language of forgiveness throughout the South African TRC (which he headed in the 1990s) was intended as a global translation of uBuntu (the South African ethic of intersubjectivity). But what goes unheard when we are listening carefully for signs of Christian forgiveness? Stauffer's engagement with this problem is insightful; her exploration of one woman's seemingly incoherent goat dream testimony during the South Africa TRC is worth noting. In it, Stauffer brings together writer Antjie Krog's work on TRC's dismissal of narratives that were confusing to the commission, but intelligible within the context of the African ethic of uBuntu, together with American philosopher Judith Butler's corrective on Freud's understanding of mourning. For Butler, when we lose someone we love, when we mourn, we also lose part of ourselves. The "I" and "you" of Western autonomy are destabilized by loss and shown to be concomitantly constituted.
9 This is a basic tenet of uBuntu, that a human is a human through her relations to other humans (this is an ontological, not empirical truth). 10 Stauffer's engagement with forgiveness and uBuntu illuminates an affective multicultural landscape of transitional justice.
As a whole, this book engages perennial issues in philosophy within the context of transitional justice: the limits of autonomy as survivors and our capacity for self-deception as listeners. Stauffer's insights about intersubjective life, social abandonment, and the human capacity for revision are original and illuminating. I recommend this book enthusiastically to philosophers and political theorists interested in Levinas, Holocaust Studies, Transitional Justice, and moral theory more generally. One of the things I like most about Tessman's work, and that distinguishes it from the vast majority of work in moral philosophy, is that it is a concerted effort to understand philosophically the moral life of those who suffer most, including the moral life of Jews in the Holocaust, the impoverished, and those living under intensive racism. Both books involve non-ideal ethical theorizing. In Moral Failure, a central claim is that conventional approaches in moral theory that try to exclude the possibility of dilemmatic situations in which we remain under moral requirements that are impossible to fulfill end up presenting an idealized picture of moral life.
Moral Failure is a unique and challenging book. While readers may not be persuaded to agree with many of the claims, it is hard not to feel the compelling force of the project. Most fundamentally, Tessman pushes us to think about a very basic question: What do we want in a normative theory? The most obvious answer is to provide action guidance about what would be the right choice in the circumstances given the feasible options. If we think of moral success as a matter of always following the correct action guide-and of normative theories as always capable of providing that guidance-we can entertain the thought that, in principle, it is always possible to lead a morally successful life. One is not required to do the impossible or to repair the irreparable, and one ought not to feel guilt for not doing either of those things.
The difficulty is that the phenomenology of the moral life is at odds with this picture. People do feel morally required to do things that they cannot do, to repair damage that cannot be repaired, and they feel guilt for their failure to do the impossible. It is not just the phenomenology of the moral life that is at odds with the "triumphalist" view of morality embedded in merely action-guiding normative theories. It is also the world. There is a substantial difference between a world in which one's choices are on the order of "Should I lie on my income tax or tell the truth?" and a world in which one's choices are on the order of "Should I stay with this abusive man on whom I and my daughter are economically dependent, or should I protect my daughter from abuse although it means severe economic deprivation for us both?" Under conditions of social oppression, severe deprivation, and genocidal practices, not only are morally dilemmatic situations ubiquitous so that agents routinely cannot avoid moral failure, but morality itself seems to fail.
These sorts of reflections prompt a different kind of answer to the question "What do we want in a normative theory?"-not just action-guidance, but the tools to capture the phenomenology of moral failure and the far from triumphalist nature of morality under severely defective social conditions.
What would those tools be? Among the most central for Tessman are the concepts of an impossible moral requirement and thus unavoidable moral failure, an acknowledgment of genuine moral dilemmas, moral pluralism (i.e, plural sources of moral value which may be incommensurable and non-fungible), sacred values (which it would be unthinkable to act against), and non-negotiable moral requirements.
The claim that there are impossible moral requirements is not at all easy to defend. The idea that "ought implies can" is standard in moral philosophy-you can only be morally required to do something that it is possible for you to do. Tessman's aim is to convince the reader that in a range of cases, you can be morally required to do what it is not possible for you to do and that persons who are oppressed are more likely to routinely face these impossible moral requirements. If there are impossible moral requirements, then moral requirements are not always action-guiding. Thus we will need a new account of what the authority of morality consists in if it is not the authority to guide what we do. Tessman's arguments for these highly original theses are built up over the course of the book as she anticipates and responds to her skeptical critic. Because the argument is so patiently, richly, and carefully crafted, the skeptical reader (as I myself was and continue to be) finds herself increasingly hard put to deny that there are impossible moral requirements.
Chapter one begins the argument by presenting the idea that there are some non-negotiable moral requirements that can't be either "eliminated" by doing something else that has even more of the same kind of moral value or by offering some compensatory benefit for violating the requirement. Non-negotiable moral requirements arise when the moral value at stake is unique (and thus acting on a competing moral requirement will involve an ineliminable loss) and where the loss of that moral value imposes a cost that no one should have to bear.
One substantial strand of the argument for the existence of impossible moral requirements relies on the phenomenology of moral experience. People just do experience some moral requirements as ones that, as she says, "don't go away" simply because we cannot fulfill them. But why, one might wonder, should one require a normative theory to be answerable to that experience as opposed to correcting it? Suppose people do experience some values as sacred-they experience what Frankfurt described as a "volitional necessity" and the "unthinkability" of acting against those sacred values-and thus take themselves to have failed morally when they cannot avoid acting against a sacred value. Granted, some Holocaust survivors report experiencing ongoing guilt and shame for failing to save others whom they could not have saved. Why take such experiences as indicative that there are impossible moral requirements rather than indicative of individual failure to think clearly about moral requirements?
At least part of the answer, as I understand Tessman (this is not something she explicitly says), is that normative theories need to be grounded in facts about human moral psychology. Chapter two, "Moral Intuition and Moral Reasoning," appeals to dual-process models of moral judgment to make that case. We are psychologically so constructed that we experience both "alarm bell" emotions that issue in automatic intuitive judgments and we also engage in controlled reasoning about what we ought to do. Were we capable of only controlled reasoning about morality, the thought that "ought implies can" would lead us to eliminate as a moral requirement doing the impossible. We would conclude that genuine moral dilemmas are either logically impossible or only apparent (involving a conflict of merely prima facie requirements only one of which is really morally required). But our moral psychology is not limited to controlled reasoning. We also form "moral aliefs" that involve the normative experience of emotions that prescribe non-negotiable moral requirements (for example, in one of the classic trolley cases, the prescription "Must not push the man on the bridge!"). This intuitive process "can produce dilemmatic moral judgments for two alarm-bell emotions could command incompatible actions" (86). It is this intuitive system that enables us to arrive at judgments that we are morally required to do the impossible (83). In addition to alarm bell prescriptive emotions, it also seems to be part of human psychology to sacralize some values and to treat acting against them as unthinkable. One might, of course, be dismissive about both intuitive moral judgments and sacred values. A view that denies that there are any non-negotiable moral requirements must dismiss these "moral" experiences as mistakes. Tessman, by contrast, takes these experiences as a bedrock of human moral psychology: for beings like us, morality includes impossible moral requirements.
But how does one go about accommodating that fact? We need, she suggests, to distinguish theories that offer action-guidance about what we ought to choose (including in dilemmatic situations where we must choose between two non-negotiable moral requirements) from a theory about what is morally required. This de-coupling of actionguiding theories from theories of moral requirements is strikingly original and provocative. De-coupling the two sorts of theories enables us to say, "You ought to choose X rather than Y, but you are morally required to do both X and Y even though doing both is impossible."
Over the course of the book, Tessman invites us to consider the costs of normative theorizing that doesn't embrace this paradoxical-sounding view. One of the costs I've already mentioned: the production of normative theories that don't track human moral experience. A second cost is developed in chapter five, "Idealizing Morality," which I take to be the central chapter of the book. That cost is normative theorizing that is simultaneously overly idealizing and overly non-ideal. It is overly non-ideal by limiting the measure of moral success to feasible options. You have done all that morality requires-you're morally successful!-so long as you use the appropriate method for choosing among competing feasible options even if this means that others suffer costs that no one should have to bear and that are neither compensatable nor reparable. It is overly ideal in presenting us with a "triumphalist" picture of moral life in which all moral costs are redeemed and moral failure is always avoidable.
There is another cost that Tessman implicitly targets particularly in the chapter four discussion of Holocaust survivors. The cost is a kind of inhumane moral theory that refuses to dignify and properly bear witness to the feelings of crushing guilt and shame that, for example, Holocaust survivors felt for what they had to do. I find this cost harder to be clear about. On the one hand, it seems inhumane not to appeal to "ought implies can" and thereby insist that survivors have no reason to feel guilty or ashamed. On the other hand, it seems inhumane to refuse to dignify the experience of having (impossibly) morally failed as one that is responsive to a genuine feature of the moral situation, instead treating the guilty, shame-filled experience of moral failure as psychologically understandable but morally misguided. Tessman herself believes that moral theories that assure us that it is always possible for us to fulfill moral requirements are both falsely reassuring and evade bearing witness to moral tragedies.
Moral Failure is an impressively synthetic book. Tessman draws on both literature in moral philosophy and empirical work in moral psychology. She also draws on and brings together philosophical conversations that aren't often connected: work on the over-demandingness of consequentialism, on care ethics and philosophy of vulnerability, on the relation between the requirements of love and the requirements of morality, and on naturalized approaches to ethics. The result is a book that proceeds at a high scholarly level and that succeeds in advancing both feminist and mainstream moral philosophy. Rejecting the philosophical tendency to privilege impartial abstract reason as the foundation of an exclusively human morality, Willett's ethics emerges from the everyday "ongoing tacit negotiation of the modes of reciprocity and of the social norms that are required to maintain groups and communities" (101). These ordinary ethical encounters cross species barriers and are resolved not through the application of abstract moral laws, but instead through transmissions of affect, proto or non linguistic conciliations, and playful contestations.
Interspecies Ethics
Central to Willett's monograph is a multi-leveled dismantling of arguments for human exceptionalism and superiority. The most obvious candidate here is the elevation of the uniquely human capacity for impartial reasoning as the foundation of universal morality. Indeed, as she aptly notes, the application of abstract moral laws has never produced cosmopolitan peace. Besides reason, Willett draws attention to other traits that we tend to consider uniquely human such as language, self-awareness, freedom, as well as a range of moral emotions like grief, humor, and a sense of fairness. At one point Willett even comically suggests a dog's ability to recognize the scent of its own urine as an alternative model of self-awareness. Thus, instead of thinking of ethics on the basis of this or that capacity for moral life, Willett begins from the continually reinforced social bonds that maintain communities within and across species. Moreover, moral theory that maintains these divisions based on the false inflation of "uniquely" human capacities can only produce a one-sided ethics. The title of the book, Interspecies Ethics, emphasizes themes of inter-relationality, inter-dependence, and non-human ethical agency. Throughout Willett's monograph vignettes of surprising animal social interactions-from raging adolescent elephants tearing up the tundra that had once been their ancestral homeland, to baboons pausing at a pool for a moment of communal quiet contemplationreveal complex bonds of kinship that cannot rightfully be reduced to human qualities. It follows that ethical capacities we have historically attributed exclusively to humans can be redrawn not through cognitive or linguistic abilities but rather through interpersonal dynamics and affect Willett's multifaceted relational call-and-response ethics for a layered self comes out of critical theory, phenomenology, and Africana philosophy, and emphasizes social relationships and expectations. Her vision for a cross-species communitarian cosmopolitan future relies on a thinking of the relational self in its multifarious modalities without foregrounding one mode of relationality as ontologically prior to others. This works to renegotiate traditional hierarchies of being that privilege human rationality over other forms of life by troubling the very boundedness of the human individual and by contextualizing what we tend to take as private personal human experiencesdepression, for example-or heroic feats of the human will, such as quitting smoking, within larger contexts of biosocial relationality that are mysteriously imperceptible yet statistically measurable. As Willett elaborates, "the wavelike circulation of energy and affect from microorganism to superorganism seems to render those of us formerly known as sovereign subjects or autonomous agents as impersonal nodes . . . through their zigzag action, these waves expand the self from an inner psyche to relational webs with and within other organisms that hover together in affect clouds" (87). Nevertheless, Willett argues that this fundamental biosocial exposure and relationality does not necessarily diminish or efface the unique singularity of our experience, our sense of mineness, because this sense of self is always intersubjectively defined.
Though we are implicated in massive webs of inter-species interrelation at social, biological, and indeed ontological levels, we are not necessarily aware of them as such. Indeed, it is easy, as a human, to move through the world in complete ignorance of the "imperceptible transmissions of energy" that form and affect us. As Willett asks, "How can we interpret responsibility in relation to those nodes of networks for cascades of agential affect that occur at the level of the superorganism?" (86 
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There is much to appreciate about Trudy Govier's Victims and Victimhood. In it she takes on a host of thorny problems, often showing both deep philosophical insight and courage as she complicates the prevailing ways philosophers have talked about victims and what they are owed. Throughout the book Govier works to challenge familiar (and overly simple) either/or binaries. "The world is not divided into two sorts of people: good guys and bad guys, victims and perpetrators" (Govier, 32). That insight seems especially valuable in a world where we often contrast "good" and "bad" people and therefore lose the nuance and subtlety that describing actual people (and not fairytale characters) requires. In particular, rejecting that binary would also be helpful in undermining the harmful need to appeal to the moral purity of black and brown victims of unjustified police violence; people of color shouldn't have to "whistle Vivaldi"
1 to try to prove themselves to be moral saints in order to try to avoid being killed. Also important is Govier's insight that victims' testimony is owed some deference but not too much: "To scrutinize the details of a victim's testimony does not amount to siding with the perpetrator" (Govier, 110). Finally, Govier is right to argue that victims' experience should be acknowledged respectfully, but not to the point of reducing them to that identity and thereby trapping them there, for "even a person who is a victim of a serious wrong is not only a victim" (Govier, 55).
Although Govier advances existing conversations, and in some places lays the groundwork for the start of new conversations, these analyses do not go far enough at many points, and so the book falls short of its significant potential. I will focus on two themes that she begins to explore that philosophers would do well to pick up and continue to develop.
First, Govier argues throughout multiple chapters that the way that philosophers traditionally have written about victims and perpetrators is too stark and that the moral gulf that divides them too broad. Though it is often appealing to think about victims as wholly innocent and perpetrators wholly guilty, the world rarely looks that way in reality. Instead, perpetrators usually aren't moral monsters, but have complicated histories that contribute to their wrongful deeds. That doesn't come as news to those who have worked in normative theory (and worked on moral responsibility in particular). What is both more novel and more central to Govier's project is that just as perpetrators are often more complicated than a news headline paints them to be, so too are victims. She argues that "To be a victim one need not be a perfect human being" (Govier, 11) and others ought to be cautious about putting victims on pedestals, beyond the reach of any type of criticism. This is a topic that warrants considerable exploration. Though Govier provides some of that exploration here, she picks examples that undermine and limit the success she is able to achieve. For instance, she notes that some of the victims who died in the World Trade Center on 9/11 were not themselves wholly innocent. Some, for instance, might have been philanderers or might have cheated on their taxes. Part of her point is to note that in honoring and remembering those who are lost to wrongful violence we tend to paint them to be moral saints, when of course they are not. However, those types of examples don't do the larger point justice.
More interesting would have been to ask not just whether someone can be a victim in one area of their life and a perpetrator or wrongdoer in others, but to ask whether someone might be both a victim and wrongdoer simultaneously. Continuing with the 9/11 example, she notes but does not develop the fact that some have suggested that some of those working in the World Trade Center had contributed to oppressive global economic arrangements which in turn inspired the attack. Though that would certainly not render the attack justified, the status of perpetrator-turned-victim would be fruitful philosophical ground to develop.
Or, as another example, one might consider whether enacting "toxic masculinity" similarly creates a complicated perpetrator/victim identity. If it is in fact harmful for men to embody many traditionally masculine traits (such as being emotionally unavailable or prone to physical violence), but in a patriarchal society men also benefit from those traits, then by being masculine it seems that men might be both perpetrators and victims as a result of the same action. The same is true for femininity. In navigating a world shot through with oppressive gender norms, women might simultaneously benefit (in some areas of life) from the display of traditionally feminine traits while also contributing to gender injustice (from which they ultimately suffer) by perpetuating them.
That question is not new; many have written about the benefits and costs of masculinity and femininity. Nonetheless, Victims and Victimhood would have been a place where that old question could have found new life. And, since "toxic masculinity" and other concepts related to structural privilege and oppression seem to have become a part of the contemporary cultural conversation, it feels like a missed opportunity to focus on less controversial (and less interesting) cases where someone is a perpetrator in some situations but a victim in others, as all adult moral agents surely are.
A second theme that Govier explores that warrants further exploration is what epistemic obligations are owed to victims and purported victims. Over several chapters she challenges and complicates the claim that others ought to be wholly deferential to those who claim to be victims. In so doing she engages with Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice and José Medina's The Epistemology of Resistance. She argues that showing excessive deference to victims (extending a credibility excess, in Fricker's terminology) can be seriously harmful, both for victims themselves, and for others in the community. Govier claims, regarding the first point, that we show victims respect by asking them questions about their claim to victimization and not taking it simply on face value that whatever they report is veridical. Though we ought to be polite and gentle, we treat victims as agents when we act as if they can support and justify their claims.
In making this point, I take it that Govier challenges responses to public reports of sexual assault (though that is not the focus of the chapters) like the hashtag "I believe you," where the default response to someone who reports having been raped is belief and epistemic support. Though I am sympathetic to Govier's claim that we show respect to victims as agents by treating them as if they are able to testify to and justify their own experience, I am very skeptical about whether (in the United States in 2016) victims of serious wrongdoing are not already expected to be able to do so. Indeed, one of the reasons why the hashtag exists is because victims and their testimony are often subjected to so much scrutiny.
Govier also claims that victims often have flawed memories or outright lie, and that doing so can be seriously harmful to the innocents who are accused of being perpetrators. That's clearly true; it can be hugely costly (financially, emotionally, socially, physically) to be accused of a wrong that you did not commit. The more interesting (because less obvious) implication of misleading or false victim testimony is what effects such testimony can have on others who are or might become victims of the purported wrong. Because there is such a presumption already against believing victims (at least of wrongs like sexual assault), when someone lies and is discovered, they diminish the credibility of others who deserve to be believed.
Unfortunately, that type of social impact is not something with which Govier meaningfully engages. Instead, she stays focused on interpersonal wrongdoing and harm. For instance, a 2014 Rolling Stone article called "A Rape on Campus" claimed that a fraternity at the University of Virginia had committed a gang rape. However, the story was later retracted and the purported victim's testimony determined to be false. Though the members of the fraternity surely suffered harm as a result of the story, I'm concerned with how that false report will affect the testimony of other women on college campuses who are victims of sexual assault. They will likely suffer a credibility deficit as a result of the credibility excess the purported victim was shown, which is a form of testimonial injustice. Though Govier discusses Fricker's work, she does not seem to take to heart the social (rather than interpersonal) implications of the harms in question.
In short, though Govier explores a number of important questions throughout, Victims and Victimhood isn't the place to start for those who are new to her valuable collection of work. Instead, I would recommend this book to those specialists who are concerned with moral responsibility and complicity within unjust systems (and who are willing to further develop the themes that Govier here begins to unpack). FEAST encourages submissions related to this year's theme. However, papers on all topics within the areas of feminist ethics and social theory are welcome. We will also consider papers outside of traditional philosophical frameworks.
CFP with keynote speaker and invited panel information coming soon!
DESCRIPTION OF THIS YEAR'S THEME
Feminist philosophy has had a legacy of expressing concern for diverse claims of minority groups, including indigenous people, while at the same time being ignorant of philosophy's role in perpetuating colonial domination within philosophical scholarship or activist pursuits. This year's conference theme aims to cultivate and encourage more feminist theorizing related to indigenous philosophies and decolonizing methodologies. How might feminist work be transformed through indigenous thought and encounters with indigenous concerns? How are concepts of identity, gender roles, reparations, nations/ national sovereignty, property, marriage, community, nature/culture, environment, and sustainability challenged or enriched by indigenous ideas and philosophies? We also invite indigenous and decolonial engagements with human rights discourses.
While feminist theorizing has been useful in bringing to light indigenous concerns, how might feminist philosophy become more of a discipline that is transformed through indigenous philosophy? How might projects of decolonization shift through an indigenous feminist philosophy? Decolonization (and colonization) projects take place in a variety of contexts/areas: geographical, psychological, epistemological, ethical, social and political, educational and pedagogical. How can feminists working in the areas of ethics and social theory engage in projects of decolonization in these areas? How can feminist philosophers contribute productively to both practical and theoretical projects of decolonization?
This year's FEAST conference invites submissions that take up feminist philosophy in relation to indigenous thought and decolonizing methods. We welcome papers that take both theoretical and practical approaches to these issues and related issues in feminist ethics, epistemology, political and social theory more broadly construed. FEAST encourages submissions related to this year's theme. However, papers on all topics within the areas of feminist ethics and social theory are welcome. We will also consider papers outside of traditional philosophical frameworks.
Topics to consider may include, but are not limited to the following:
• Challenges to sovereignty understood as a nationbuilding concept
• Reconceiving empowerment within indigenous communities
• Gender and sexual differences within indigenous communities, including the idea of gender complementarity versus gender equality
• Intersectionality within indigenous communities: race, gender, sexuality, class, post-colonial
• Indigenous trans/queer identities: two-spirit, fa'afafine, mahoo, etc.
• Indigenous feminist critiques of feminist philosophy
• Cultural appropriation and the problems of feminists "going native"
• Ecofeminism and indigenous philosophy/ ecofeminist indigenous philosophy
• Women and gender in indigenous cosmological thought
• What is indigenous, indigeneity, or native?
• Reparations
• Indigenous conceptions of education and feminist pedagogy
• Indigenous intellectual sovereignty and/or intellectual exploitation (such as bio-piracy)
• Human rights and indigenous peoples and philosophies
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS: DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS
A signature event of FEAST conferences is a lunch-time "Difficult Conversation" that focuses on an important, challenging, and under-theorized topic related to feminist ethics or social theory.
In keeping with this year's theme of Indigenizing Feminist Philosophy, this year our topic for the difficult conversation panel is Cultural Appropriation in Feminist Scholarship. This conversation hopes to provide an environment conducive to dialogue for and among native and non-native, women of color, and white academics concerning the harms produced by practices of cultural appropriation in feminist scholarship. We hope that we can openly discuss the concerns of exclusion among native feminist scholars in philosophy and culturally appropriate practices in utilizing indigenous thought in feminist philosophy.
We are soliciting abstracts (see below) that address, in both North American and transnational contexts, the ethics of responsible scholarship, concrete experiences of the difficulties and limits of cultural appropriation of indigenous thought from both native and non-native perspectives, cross-cultural pursuits in scholarship, strategies for being a culturally competent scholar when addressing indigenous thought, well-intentioned but misplaced pedagogical and scholarly strategies, strategies in decolonizing feminist philosophy, and effective activism that does not undermine indigenous concerns.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
Please send your submission in one document (a Word file, please, so that abstracts can be posted) to FEAST2017submissions@rollins.edu by February 28, 2017. In the body of the email message, please include your paper or panel title, name, institutional affiliation, e-mail address, surface mail address, and phone number. All submissions will be anonymously reviewed.
Individual Papers
Please submit a completed paper of no more than 3,000 words, along with an abstract of 100-250 words, for anonymous review. Your document must include paper title, abstract of 100-250 words, and your paper, with no identifying information. The word count (max. 3,000) should appear on the top of the first page of your paper.
Panels
Please clearly mark your submission as a panel submission both in the body of the e-mail and on the submission itself. Your submission should include the panel title and all three abstracts and papers in one document, along with word counts (no more than 3,000 for each paper).
Difficult
Conversations and other non-paper submissions (e.g., workshops, discussions, etc.) Please submit an abstract with a detailed description (500-750 words). Please clearly indicate the type of submission (Difficult Conversation, workshop, roundtable discussion, etc.) both in the body of your e-mail and on the submission itself.
For more information on FEAST or to see programs from previous conferences, go to http://www.afeast.org.
Questions on this conference or the submission process may be directed to the program chairs, Celia BardwellJones (celiab@hawaii.edu) and/or Margaret McLaren (mmclaren@rollins.edu).
Call for Blog Posts: Sexual Violence in Higher Education
ConditionallyAccepted.com-a weekly career advice column for marginalized scholars on InsideHigherEdwelcomes blog posts about sexual assault, rape, stalking, intimate partner violence, and sexual harassment in higher education. We are especially interested in reflections on sexual violence as a manifestation of systems of oppression other than sexism (like racism, classism) and at the intersections among systems of oppression; in addition, we are interested in featuring essays on sexual violence perpetrated against women of color, fat and plus-size people, LGBTQ+ people, and people with disabilities. See the full call for blog posts at https://conditionallyaccepted. com/2016/10/04/sexual-violence/. Blog posts should range between 750 and 1,250 words and be written for a broad academic audience. We pay $200 per post (if accepted). Please email pitches or full blog posts to conditionally. accepted@insidehighered.com.
Susan Stark is associate professor of philosophy at Bates College. She teaches courses in ethics, feminism, social philosophy, and Ancient Greek philosophy. Her writing focuses on moral psychology, ethical theory, and moral responsibility. Her most recent publication, "Ordinary Virtue," appeared in Res Philosophica in 2015 (Vol 92 (4), October 2015). Susan also has a long-standing interest in her research and teaching on understanding and overcoming all forms of oppression, but especially oppression based on race and gender.
Matt L. Drabek is a content specialist at ACT, Inc., in Iowa City, IA, and a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Iowa. His research interests include social philosophy, feminist philosophy, and philosophical issues in the social sciences. His first book, Classify and Label: The Unintended Marginalization of Social Groups, was published in 2014 (paperback edition in 2016). He is presently working on the social effects of propaganda as well as how to assess critical thinking in postsecondary education and the workforce. At West Point, he regularly teaches introductory courses in philosophy and ethics and has taught courses on Kant, nineteenth-century philosophy, social ontology, and feminist ethical and political theory. Recently, he has become extremely interested in the role of gender in our normative understanding of the military and war. This project is tentatively titled "Families, Armies, and Gender." Nancy J. Matchett is associate professor and chair of philosophy at the University of Northern Colorado, where her scholarship and teaching are focused on putting philosophy to practical use. She is also certified as an individual client counselor by the American Philosophical Practitioners Association and serves as a phone consultant for the Ethics AdviceLine for Journalists. Her interests cluster around ethical deliberation, moral psychology, personal identity and practical agency, and most of her publications deal in some way with the relationship between ethical theory and moral practice, or with successful practices in ethics teaching and training. 
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